Revue | Volume
Volume 191 (14)
Détails | Table des matières
Wittgenstein and the dualism of the inner and the outer
pp.3173-3194
https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-014-0441-2
Generalizing empirical adequacy i
multiplicity and approximation
pp.3195-3225
https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-014-0440-3
In defense of non-reductionism in the epistemology of testimony
pp.3227-3237
https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-014-0443-0
A defence of epistemic responsibility
why laziness and ignorance are bad after all
pp.3297-3309
https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-014-0445-y
On what inferentially justifies what
the vices of reliabilism and proper functionalism
pp.3311-3328
https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-014-0446-x
Idealization, epistemic logic, and epistemology
pp.3351-3366
https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-014-0448-8
Functional explaining
a new approach to the philosophy of explanation
pp.3367-3391
https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-014-0452-z
The Ryōan-Ji axiom for common knowledge on hypergraphs
pp.3407-3426
https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-014-0455-9
Presentism, truthmakers and distributional properties
pp.3427-3446
https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-014-0456-8
Information is intrinsically semantic but alethically neutral
pp.3447-3467
https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-014-0457-7
Erratum to
model change and methodological virtues in scientific inference
pp.3469-3472
Détails de la publication
Revue: Synthese
Volume: 191
Numéro: 14
Année: 2014
Citation complète:
(dir.), 2014, Synthese 191 (14).