Doxastic planning and epistemic internalism
pp. 2571-2591
Résumé
In the following I discuss the debate between epistemological internalists and externalists from an unfamiliar meta-epistemological perspective. In doing so, I focus on the question of whether rationality is best captured in externalist or internalist terms. Using a conception of epistemic judgments as “doxastic plans,” I characterize one important subspecies of judgments about epistemic rationality—focusing on the distinctive rational/functional role these judgments play in regulating how we form beliefs. Then I show why any judgment that plays this role should be expected to behave the manner internalists predict. In this way, I argue, we can explain why our basic toolbox for epistemic evaluation includes an internalist conception of rationality.
Détails de la publication
Publié dans:
(2014) Synthese 191 (12).
Pages: 2571-2591
DOI: 10.1007/s11229-014-0412-7
Citation complète:
Schafer Karl, 2014, Doxastic planning and epistemic internalism. Synthese 191 (12), 2571-2591. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-014-0412-7.