Revue | Volume
Volume 191 (12)
Détails | Table des matières
Trust and belief
a preemptive reasons account
pp.2593-2615
https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-014-0416-3
Transmission arguments against knowledge closure are still fallacious
pp.2617-2632
https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-014-0403-8
The function debate
between "cheap tricks' and evolutionary neutrality
pp.2653-2671
https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-014-0407-4
Model change and reliability in scientific inference
pp.2673-2693
https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-014-0408-3
Functional analysis and mechanistic explanation
pp.2695-2714
https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-014-0410-9
Where there are internal defeaters, there are "confirmers"
pp.2715-2728
https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-014-0415-4
They've lost control
reflections on skill
pp.2729-2750
https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-014-0411-8
Are there limits to scientists' obligations to seek and engage dissenters?
pp.2751-2765
https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-014-0414-5
Hume, Goodman and radical inductive skepticism
pp.2791-2813
https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-014-0417-2
Uniting model theory and the universalist tradition of logic
Carnap's early axiomatics
pp.2815-2833
https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-014-0425-2Détails de la publication
Revue: Synthese
Volume: 191
Numéro: 12
Année: 2014
Citation complète:
(dir.), 2014, Synthese 191 (12).