Inconsistency and scientific realism
pp. 2941-2955
Résumé
I erect a framework within the semantic view of theories for explaining the empirical success of internally inconsistent models and theories, with scientific realism in mind. The framework is an instance of the ‘content-driven’ approach to inconsistency, advocated by both Norton (Philos Sci 54:327–350, 1987) and Smith (Stud Hist Philos Sci 19:429–445, 1988a, In: Fine A, Leplin J (eds) PSA1988, 1988b), whose ideas my analysis aims to clarify and substantiate.
Détails de la publication
Publié dans:
Bueno Otávio, Vickers Peter (2014) Is science inconsistent?. Synthese 191 (13).
Pages: 2941-2955
DOI: 10.1007/s11229-014-0466-6
Citation complète:
Saatsi Juha, 2014, Inconsistency and scientific realism. Synthese 191 (13), Is science inconsistent?, 2941-2955. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-014-0466-6.