Revue | Volume
Neuroscience and its philosophy
Volume 191 (2)
Détails | Table des matières
Minimal models and canonical neural computations
the distinctness of computational explanation in neuroscience
pp.127-153
https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-013-0369-y
Is memory for remembering?
recollection as a form of episodic hypothetical thinking
pp.155-185
https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-013-0247-7
Attention, consciousness, and the semantics of questions
pp.187-211
https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-013-0382-1
The neuroscientific study of free will
a diagnosis of the controversy
pp.245-262
https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-013-0312-2
Dreams
an empirical way to settle the discussion between cognitive and non-cognitive theories of consciousness
pp.263-285
https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-013-0385-yDétails de la publication
Revue: Synthese
Volume: 191
Numéro: 2
Année: 2014
Citation complète:
Piccinini Gualtiero (dir.), 2014, Neuroscience and its philosophy, Synthese 191 (2).