Revue | Volume
Volume 191 (3)
Détails | Table des matières
The main two arguments for probabilism are flawed
pp.287-295
https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-013-0286-0
The developmental paradox of false belief understanding
a dual-system solution
pp.297-320
https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-012-0127-6
Children's first and second-order false-belief reasoning in a verbal and a low-verbal task
pp.321-333
https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-012-0169-9
"Theory of mind" in animals
ways to make progress
pp.335-354
https://doi.org/
Children's strategy use when playing strategic games
pp.355-370
https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-012-0212-x
Exploring the tractability border in epistemic tasks
pp.371-408
https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-012-0215-7
Agreeing to disagree in probabilistic dynamic epistemic logic
pp.409-438
https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-013-0280-6
Optimisation and mathematical explanation
doing the Lévy walk
pp.459-479
https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-013-0284-2
Towards a semantics for the artifactual theory of fiction and beyond
pp.499-516
https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-013-0287-z
"it is not a something , but not a nothing either!"—McDowell on Wittgenstein
pp.557-567
https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-013-0291-3Détails de la publication
Revue: Synthese
Volume: 191
Numéro: 3
Année: 2014
Citation complète:
(dir.), 2014, Synthese 191 (3).