Rigidity and triviality
pp. 1993-1999
Résumé
Though it is often claimed that some general terms are rigid designators, it has turned out to be difficult to give a satisfying definition that (1) avoids making all general terms rigid (the overgeneralization problem), and (2) even if a non-rigid reading is available, makes that non-rigid reading matter (the trivialization problem). Several authors have attempted to develop examples that meet the trivialization challenge, with Martí and Martínez-Fernández providing what is, perhaps, the most convincing strategy. I show that the type of example Martí and Martínez-Fernández offer nevertheless fails to meet the trivialization challenge and, accordingly, that we should still have serious doubts about whether continuing the search for a non-trivial definition of general term rigidity would be fruitful.
Détails de la publication
Publié dans:
Piccinini Gualtiero (2018) Neuroscience and its philosophy. Synthese 195 (5).
Pages: 1993-1999
DOI: 10.1007/s11229-016-1311-x
Citation complète:
Haraldsen Fredrik, 2018, Rigidity and triviality. Synthese 195 (5), Neuroscience and its philosophy, 1993-1999. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-016-1311-x.