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Maimon's "quid facti" argument
pp. 176-199
Résumé
Maimon's "quid facti" argument is traditionally regarded as his most serious objection to Kant's transcendental philosophy, its conclusion being that Kant's theory of experience is inadvertently compatible with Hume's skepticism. He esteems Kant's painstaking analysis of the concept of experience as one of the supreme achievements of the human mind, comparable to Euclid's.1 Nevertheless, Kant's resp
Détails de la publication
Publié dans:
Freudenthal Gideon (2003) Salomon Maimon: rational dogmatist, empirical skeptic: critical assessments. Dordrecht, Springer.
Pages: 176-199
DOI: 10.1007/978-94-017-2936-9_8
Citation complète:
Senderowicz Yaron, 2003, Maimon's "quid facti" argument. In G. Freudenthal (ed.) Salomon Maimon: rational dogmatist, empirical skeptic (176-199). Dordrecht, Springer.