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Maimon's subversion of Kant's critique of pure reason
there are no synthetic a priori judgments in physics
pp. 144-175
Résumé
Maimon characterized his philosophical position as "rational dogmatism and empirical skepticism" (Tr, II, 436). In this paper I concentrate on the latter half of this description, and argue that Maimon's empirical skepticism subverts and jeopardizes Kant's project in the Critique of Pure Reason.1
Détails de la publication
Publié dans:
Freudenthal Gideon (2003) Salomon Maimon: rational dogmatist, empirical skeptic: critical assessments. Dordrecht, Springer.
Pages: 144-175
DOI: 10.1007/978-94-017-2936-9_7
Citation complète:
Freudenthal Gideon, 2003, Maimon's subversion of Kant's critique of pure reason: there are no synthetic a priori judgments in physics. In G. Freudenthal (ed.) Salomon Maimon: rational dogmatist, empirical skeptic (144-175). Dordrecht, Springer.