Synthese

Revue | Volume

Scientific realism

Volume 196 (2)

Édité parDarrell P. Rowbottom Jamin Asay

Détails | Table des matières

Scientific realism

what it is, the contemporary debate, and new directions

Darrell P. Rowbottom

pp.451-484

https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-017-1484-y

Naturalistic quietism or scientific realism? Johanna Wolff

pp.485-498

https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-015-0873-3

Entity realism and singularist semirealism Bence Nanay

pp.499-517

https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-016-1179-9

Nominalism, realism and objectivity Catherine Z. Elgin

pp.519-534

https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-016-1114-0

Should a historically motivated anti-realist be a Stanfordite? Greg Frost-Arnold

pp.535-551

https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-016-1050-z

Discarded theories

the role of changing interests

K. Brad Wray

pp.553-569

https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-016-1058-4

Towards a realistic success-to-truth inference for scientific realism Peter Vickers

pp.571-585

https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-016-1150-9

Going local

a defense of methodological localism about scientific realism

Jamin Asay

pp.587-609

https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-016-1072-6

What is theoretical progress of science? Juha Saatsi

pp.611-631

https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-016-1118-9

Are mental representations underdeterminacy-free? Claudia Picazo Jaque

pp.633-654

https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-017-1494-9

Why be a methodological individualist? Julie Zahle Harold Kincaid

pp.655-675

https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-017-1523-8

Is the experience of pain transparent? Murat Aydede

pp.677-708

https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-017-1528-3

Stance empiricism and epistemic Reason Jonathan Reid Surovell

pp.709-733

https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-017-1539-0

Free choice reasons Daniel Bonevac

pp.735-760

https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-017-1540-7

Détails de la publication

Revue: Synthese

Volume: 196

Numéro: 2

Année: 2019

Citation complète:

Rowbottom Darrell P., Asay Jamin (dir.), 2019, Scientific realism, Synthese 196 (2).