Synthese

Revue | Volume

Volume 196 (4)

Détails | Table des matières

Introduction

primitivism versus reductionism about the problem of the unity of the proposition

Manuel García-Carpintero Bjørn Jespersen

pp.1209-1224

https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-018-1727-6

Regress, unity, facts, and propositions Matti Eklund

pp.1225-1247

https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-016-1155-4

If structured propositions are logical procedures then how are procedures individuated? Marie Duží

pp.1249-1283

https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-017-1595-5

Anatomy of a proposition Bjørn Jespersen

pp.1285-1324

https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-017-1512-y

From the unity of the proposition to linguistic idealism Richard Gaskin

pp.1325-1342

https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-016-1081-5

On propositions and fineness of grain (again!) Jeffrey C. King

pp.1343-1367

https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-016-1291-x

Propositions as cognitive acts Scott Soames

pp.1369-1383

https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-016-1168-z

On cancellation Peter Hanks

pp.1385-1402

https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-016-1260-4

Force cancellation François Récanati

pp.1403-1424

https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-016-1223-9

Unity through truth Bryan Pickel

pp.1425-1452

https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-016-1279-6

Act theories and the attitudes Jeff Speaks

pp.1453-1473

https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-016-1219-5

Structured propositions and the logical form of predication Gary Ostertag

pp.1475-1499

https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-017-1420-1

A general argument against structured propositions Peter Pagin

pp.1501-1528

https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-016-1244-4

What propositional structure could not be Lorraine Juliano Keller

pp.1529-1553

https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-017-1585-7

Denial and retraction

a challenge for theories of taste predicates

Julia Zakkou

pp.1555-1573

https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-017-1520-y

Believing the best

on doxastic partiality in friendship

Lindsay Crawford

pp.1575-1593

https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-017-1521-x

Continuity of change in Kant's dynamics Michael Bennett McNulty Michael Y. Bennett

pp.1595-1622

https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-017-1527-4

The imprecise impermissivist's dilemma Clinton Castro Casey Hart

pp.1623-1640

https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-017-1530-9

"Ought" implies "can" against epistemic deontologism

beyond doxastic involuntarism

Charles Côté-Bouchard

pp.1641-1656

https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-017-1531-8

Détails de la publication

Revue: Synthese

Volume: 196

Numéro: 4

Année: 2019

Citation complète:

(dir.), 2019, Synthese 196 (4).