In his paper Professor Stroud advances the thesis that the traditional approach to epistemology, which takes scepticism seriously, is superior to a currently widespread attitude of simply ignoring the sceptic and his doubts by confining the epistemological task to some sort of naturalistic description and reconstruction of the epistemic procedures actually employed by scientists and other knowing subjects. He claims that it is only by dealing with the questions raised by the sceptic that we can arrive at a full understanding of the nature and possibility of human knowledge. What he argues for is the view that no theory of knowledge, no assessment of our epistemic situation regarding the world can ever be satisfactory unless it succeeds in giving an account of the appeal that scepticism has had in philosophy since Descartes. Even if we should be convinced that Descartes just gave us something to play with and that it is high time to realize that we should give up this admittedly suggestive paradigm of philosophy, we still ought to try to give arguments for this view. Otherwise there will remain a suspicion that what we have before us is simply a change of fashion. Consequently, Stroud tries to convince us of the need for a diagnostic investigation which would expose the origins and the conceptual resources of philosophical scepticism that have been and still are responsible for its threatening force. The paper echoes Kant's methodological maxim that it will not do in philosophical contexts to ignore a position we want to discard, even if we think we have abundant reason to abandon it.