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On Bennett's "analytic transcendental arguments"
pp. 65-69
Résumé
Professor Bennett freely admits that his understanding of what a "transcendental argument" is, differs from the Kantian and that he uses the term in his own — rather special — way. Although I am opposed to such terminological separatism, I shall not argue against it here. Nor shall I discuss the interesting remarks which lead up to, and which follow, what I take to be the central part of Bennett's paper, namely the characterization and exemplification of what he calls "analytic transcendental arguments". In examining them I shall be mainly concerned with their tendency to leave open deductive gaps between their premises and their conclusions, and with the difficulty of bridging these gaps in a satisfactory manner — a difficulty which they share with other transcendental arguments and which seems insuperable to me.
Détails de la publication
Publié dans:
Bieri Peter, Horstmann Rolf-Peter, Krüger Lorenz (1979) Transcendental arguments and science: essays in epistemology. Dordrecht, Springer.
Pages: 65-69
DOI: 10.1007/978-94-009-9410-2_5
Citation complète:
Körner Stephan, 1979, On Bennett's "analytic transcendental arguments". In P. Bieri, R.-P. Horstmann & L. Krüger (eds.) Transcendental arguments and science (65-69). Dordrecht, Springer.