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The tradition of legal positivism in modern legal thought
pp. 57-71
Résumé
Why do jurists and officials consider certain norms/rules as legally binding? How is it possible for officials to insist that their role is not to question the political wisdom or substantive moral content of norms/rules? Why do lawyers and judges, to be more specific, observe from the sidelines, as it were, as if their norms/rules were impersonal and their decisions distanced?
Détails de la publication
Publié dans:
Conklin William E (2001) The invisible origins of legal positivism: a re-reading of a tradition. Dordrecht, Springer.
Pages: 57-71
DOI: 10.1007/978-94-010-0808-2_4
Citation complète:
Conklin William E, 2001, The tradition of legal positivism in modern legal thought. In W.E. Conklin The invisible origins of legal positivism (57-71). Dordrecht, Springer.