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Experience and perceptual belief
pp. 5-19
Résumé
Are perceptual experiences reasons for perceptual beliefs? The act/ content ambiguity of the term "belief" carries over to this question. I argue, following Popper, that experiences are reasons as well as causes for belief-acts, but not for belief-contents. This involves rejecting justificationism, the mistaken view that a reason for a belief-act must be a reason for its content. Popper's many critics presuppose justificationism, and so miss the main point of his solution to the problem of the empirical basis of science.
Détails de la publication
Publié dans:
Parusniková Zuzana, Cohen Robert S (2009) Rethinking Popper. Dordrecht, Springer.
Pages: 5-19
DOI: 10.1007/978-1-4020-9338-8_1
Citation complète:
Musgrave Alan, 2009, Experience and perceptual belief. In Z. Parusniková & R.S. Cohen (eds.) Rethinking Popper (5-19). Dordrecht, Springer.