Linguistique de l’écrit

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The ontology of explanation

David-Hillel Ruben

pp. 67-85

Résumé

John Watkins and I seem to be equally out of fashion in our shared views on explanation. There is no shame in this, since fashions change but the truth is forever. I, like him, cannot make such sense of the idea of probabilistic or statistical explanation. I do not share his rejection of inductive argument per se, but since I agree with him that "the occurrence at a particular time of a chance event simply defies all explanation",1 I hold that no such non-deductive argument whose conclusion mentions a particular event could count as an explanation of that particular event, however highly probable, given the premises, that conclusion is.

Détails de la publication

Publié dans:

D'Agostino Fred, Jarvie I. C. (1989) Freedom and rationality: essays in honor of John Watkins from his colleagues and friends. Dordrecht, Springer.

Pages: 67-85

DOI: 10.1007/978-94-009-2380-5_5

Citation complète:

Ruben David-Hillel, 1989, The ontology of explanation. In F. D'agostino & I. C. Jarvie (eds.) Freedom and rationality (67-85). Dordrecht, Springer.