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Russell on acquaintance with spatial properties
the significance of James
pp. 229-263
Résumé
The standard, foundationalist reading of Our Knowledge of the External World requires Russell to have a view of perceptual acquaintance that he demonstrably does not have. Russell's actual purpose in "constructing" physical bodies out of sense-data is instead to show that psychology and physics are consistent. But how seriously engaged was Russell with actual psychology? I show that OKEW makes some non-trivial assumptions about the character of visual space, and I argue that he drew those assumptions from William James's Principles of Psychology. This point helps us take a fresh look at the complex relationship between the two men. In light of this surprising background of agreement, I highlight ways their more general approaches to perception finally diverged in ways that put the two at epistemological odds.
Détails de la publication
Publié dans:
Lapointe Sandra, Pincock Christopher (2017) Innovations in the history of analytical philosophy. Basingstoke, Palgrave Macmillan.
Pages: 229-263
DOI: 10.1057/978-1-137-40808-2_8
Citation complète:
Klein Alexander, 2017, Russell on acquaintance with spatial properties: the significance of James. In S. Lapointe & C. Pincock (eds.) Innovations in the history of analytical philosophy (229-263). Basingstoke, Palgrave Macmillan.