Livre | Chapitre
Myself with no body?
body, bodily-consciousness and self-consciousness
pp. 180-200
Résumé
De facto, subjects are bodily, but is this necessarily so? This question unfolds into the following two: Can one be self-conscious without being a body? Can one be self-conscious without being bodily-conscious? In this paper, I will describe different aspects of bodily-self-consciousness and argue that the most radical attempts to demonstrate the contingency of the bodily nature of self-consciousness failed. The idea here is that the strength of the anchoring of self-consciousness in the body and bodily-consciousness can be evaluated by considering whether (and which) forms of bodily-self-consciousness resist even against radical theoretical and clinical cases of purported disembodiment.
Détails de la publication
Publié dans:
Gallagher Shaun, Schmicking Daniel (2010) Handbook of phenomenology and cognitive science. Dordrecht, Springer.
Pages: 180-200
DOI: 10.1007/978-90-481-2646-0_10
Citation complète:
Legrand Dorothée, 2010, Myself with no body?: body, bodily-consciousness and self-consciousness. In S. Gallagher & D. Schmicking (eds.) Handbook of phenomenology and cognitive science (180-200). Dordrecht, Springer.