Linguistique de l’écrit

Revue internationale en libre accès

Livre | Chapitre

175944

The empirical and transcendental ego

Maurice Natanson

pp. 42-53

Résumé

Psychologists have often distinguished between the ego and the self, taking ego as subject and self as object of thought. So, for example, George H. Mead's distinction of the "I" and "me" aspects of the self points, at one level at least, to the "I" as the subject and the "me" as the object of any act. More explicitly, William James in the first volume of his Principles of Psychology distinguishes between the self and the ego. But James is quick to establish a distinction between what he calls the "empirical self" and the "pure ego." "The Empirical Self of each of us," he writes, "is all that he is tempted to call by name of me"1 but the pure ego refers to a "pure principle of personal identity" and leads ultimately to considerations of transcendental philosophy.

Détails de la publication

Publié dans:

Natanson Maurice, Hering Jean, Wild John, Kaufmann Fritz (1959) For Roman Ingarden: nine essays in phenomenology. Dordrecht, Springer.

Pages: 42-53

DOI: 10.1007/978-94-011-9086-2_4

Citation complète:

Natanson Maurice, 1959, The empirical and transcendental ego. In M. Natanson, J. Hering, J. Wild & F. Kaufmann For Roman Ingarden (42-53). Dordrecht, Springer.