This paper tackles the question of whether the order of concepts was still a relevant aspect of scientific rigour in the 19th and 20th centuries, especially in the case of authors who were deeply influenced by the Leibnizian project of a universal characteristic. Three case studies will be taken into account: Hermann Graßmann, Giuseppe Peano and Kurt Gödel. The main claim will be that the choice of primitive concepts was not only a question of convenience in modern hypothetico-deductive investigations, but sometimes also the result of philosophical investigations onto the foundation of scienti­fic disciplines. The question of the "right" order of concepts is an ideal to be followed rather than a task that can be fulfilled, but remains nonetheless an essential part of the axiomatic enterprise. This paper aims to question whether there is in fact such a stark contrast, as there is often claimed to be in the literature, between the debates relating to the right order of concepts and the foundational questions concerning modern axiomatics. The scientific rupture determined by the appearance of hypothetico-deductive systems in mathema­tics and logic should thus not be dissociated from some relevant continuities concerning the ideal of knowledge as the search for a general theory of concepts deriving from some fundamental elements.