Linguistique de l’écrit

Revue internationale en libre accès

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146549

Third-person self-knowledge, self-interpretation, and narrative

Édité parPatrizia PedriniJulie Kirsch

Résumé

In recent years, the idea that each person is in a privileged position to acquire knowledge about her own mental states has come under attack. A growing body of empirical research has cast doubt upon the existence of what philosophers call "first person self-knowledge', i.e., knowledge about our mental states that is often thought to be immediate, transparent, and authoritative. This line of thought has led some philosophers to claim that what seems to be "first-person self-knowledge' is really just "third-person self-knowledge,' i.e., knowledge about our mental states that is inferential, opaque, and fallible. This book discusses challenges for first-person knowledge and explores the true nature of third-person knowledge.

Détails | Table des matières

Détails de la publication

Maison d'édition: Springer

Lieu de publication: Dordrecht

Année: 2018

Pages: 215

Collection: Contributions to Phenomenology


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: 96

DOI: 10.1007/978-3-319-98646-3

ISBN (hardback): 978-3-319-98644-9

ISBN (digital): 978-3-319-98646-3

Citation complète:

Pedrini Patrizia, Kirsch Julie (éd.), 2018, Third-person self-knowledge, self-interpretation, and narrative. Dordrecht, Springer.