What concepts do
pp. 289-310
Résumé
This paper identifies and criticizes a line of reasoning that has played a substantial role in the widespread rejection of the view that Fodor has dubbed “Concept Atomism”. The line of reasoning is not only fallacious, but its application in the present case rests on a misconception about the explanatory potential of Concept Atomism. This diagnosis suggests the possibility of a new polemical strategy in support of Concept Atomism. The new strategy is more comprehensive than that which defenders of the view, namely Fodor, have employed.
Détails de la publication
Publié dans:
McLaughlin Brian P, Crane Tim (2009) The philosophy of Jerry Fodor. Synthese 170 (2).
Pages: 289-310
DOI: 10.1007/s11229-009-9584-y
Citation complète:
Edwards Kevan, 2009, What concepts do. Synthese 170 (2), The philosophy of Jerry Fodor, 289-310. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-009-9584-y.