Quantum probabilities and the conjunction principle
pp. 109-114
Résumé
A recent argument by Hawthorne and Lasonen-Aarnio purports to show that we can uphold the principle that competently forming conjunctions is a knowledge-preserving operation only at the cost of a rampant skepticism about the future. A key premise of their argument is that, in light of quantum-mechanical considerations, future contingents never quite have chance 1 of being true. We argue, by drawing attention to the order of magnitude of the relevant quantum probabilities, that the skeptical threat of Hawthorne and Lasonen-Aarnio’s argument is illusory.
Détails de la publication
Publié dans:
Peijnenburg Jeanne, Fitelson Branden, Douven Igor (2012) Probability, confirmation and fallacies. Synthese 184 (1).
Pages: 109-114
DOI: 10.1007/s11229-009-9693-7
Citation complète:
Douven Igor, Uffink Jos, 2012, Quantum probabilities and the conjunction principle. Synthese 184 (1), Probability, confirmation and fallacies, 109-114. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-009-9693-7.