You better play 7
mutual versus common knowledge of advice in a weak-link experiment
pp. 1351-1381
Résumé
This paper presents the results of an experiment on mutual versus common knowledge of advice in a two-player weak-link game with random matching. Our experimental subjects play in pairs for thirteen rounds. After a brief learning phase common to all treatments, we vary the knowledge levels associated with external advice given in the form of a suggestion to pick the strategy supporting the payoff-dominant equilibrium. Our results are somewhat surprising and can be summarized as follows: in all our treatments both the choice of the efficiency-inducing action and the percentage of efficient equilibrium play are higher with respect to the control treatment, revealing that even a condition as weak as mutual knowledge of level 1 is sufficient to significantly increase the salience of the efficient equilibrium with respect to the absence of advice. Furthermore, and contrary to our hypothesis, mutual knowledge of level 2 induces, under suitable conditions, successful coordination more frequently than common knowledge.
Détails de la publication
Publié dans:
Hartmann Stephan, Lisciandra Chiara, Machery Edouard (2013) Formal epistemology meets experimental philosophy. Synthese 190 (8).
Pages: 1351-1381
DOI: 10.1007/s11229-012-0177-9
Citation complète:
Devetag Giovanna, Hosni Hykel, Sillari Giacomo, 2013, You better play 7: mutual versus common knowledge of advice in a weak-link experiment. Synthese 190 (8), Formal epistemology meets experimental philosophy, 1351-1381. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-012-0177-9.