Reconciling probability theory and coherentism
pp. 1075-1084
Résumé
Recent results in the literature appear to show that it is impossible for two independent testimonies to jointly raise the probability of a proposition if neither testimony individually has any impact on that probability. I show that these impossibility results do not apply when testimonies agree on incidental details.
Détails de la publication
Publié dans:
(2014) Synthese 191 (6).
Pages: 1075-1084
DOI: 10.1007/s11229-013-0310-4
Citation complète:
Duddy Conal, 2014, Reconciling probability theory and coherentism. Synthese 191 (6), 1075-1084. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-013-0310-4.