Revue | Volume
Volume 191 (16)
Détails | Table des matières
Hume's definitions of "cause"
without idealizations, within the bounds of science
pp.3803-3819
https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-014-0499-x
Probabilistic measures of coherence
from adequacy constraints towards pluralism
pp.3821-3845
https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-014-0501-7
Why so negative?
evidence aggregation and armchair philosophy
pp.3865-3896
https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-014-0509-z
Philosophical perspectives on ad hoc hypotheses and the higgs mechanism
pp.3897-3917
https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-014-0504-4
A psychofunctionalist argument against nonconceptualism
pp.3919-3934
https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-014-0505-3
Non-psychological weakness of will
self-control, stereotypes, and consequences
pp.3935-3954
https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-014-0508-0
Confirmation measures and collaborative belief updating
pp.3955-3975
https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-014-0507-1
Epistemic closure, assumptions and topics of inquiry
pp.3977-4002
https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-014-0522-2Détails de la publication
Revue: Synthese
Volume: 191
Numéro: 16
Année: 2014
Citation complète:
(dir.), 2014, Synthese 191 (16).