On the ignorance, knowledge, and nature of propositions
pp. 3647-3662
Résumé
Deploying distinctions between ignorance of (p) and ignorance that (p) (is true), and between knowledge of (p) and knowledge that (p) (is true), I address a question that has hitherto received little attention, namely: what is it to have knowledge of propositions? I then provide a taxonomy of ontological conceptions of the nature of propositions, and explore several of their interesting epistemological implications.
Détails de la publication
Publié dans:
Jantzen Benjamin C., Mayo Deborah G., Patton Lydia (2015) Ontology & methodology. Synthese 192 (11).
Pages: 3647-3662
DOI: 10.1007/s11229-015-0712-6
Citation complète:
Le Morvan Pierre, 2015, On the ignorance, knowledge, and nature of propositions. Synthese 192 (11), Ontology & methodology, 3647-3662. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-015-0712-6.