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Lecture XII
pp. 109-116
Résumé
We come back to the question why the logical method of rigorous logical inferences that works so well in geometry cannot be used in philosophy. Philosophical concepts are already in place before we begin philosophising, so that any attempt at defining them ends up in concept-swapping, i.e. replacing the original concept with a different and arbitrary one. Whenever philosophers do that, they equivocate. This fallacy is often compounded with circular definitions.
Détails de la publication
Publié dans:
Nelson Leonard (2016) A theory of philosophical fallacies. Dordrecht, Springer.
Pages: 109-116
DOI: 10.1007/978-3-319-20783-4_13
Citation complète:
Nelson Leonard, 2016, Lecture XII. In L. Nelson A theory of philosophical fallacies (109-116). Dordrecht, Springer.