Linguistique de l’écrit

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Lecture XII

Leonard Nelson

pp. 109-116

Résumé

We come back to the question why the logical method of rigorous logical inferences that works so well in geometry cannot be used in philosophy. Philosophical concepts are already in place before we begin philosophising, so that any attempt at defining them ends up in concept-swapping, i.e. replacing the original concept with a different and arbitrary one. Whenever philosophers do that, they equivocate. This fallacy is often compounded with circular definitions.

Détails de la publication

Publié dans:

Nelson Leonard (2016) A theory of philosophical fallacies. Dordrecht, Springer.

Pages: 109-116

DOI: 10.1007/978-3-319-20783-4_13

Citation complète:

Nelson Leonard, 2016, Lecture XII. In L. Nelson A theory of philosophical fallacies (109-116). Dordrecht, Springer.