According to Thomas Pogge's theory of human rights, those of us in the developed world have a negative duty to eliminate world poverty. In other words, we have a duty not only to help the global poor but to stop harming them by hoarding natural resources, dictating inequitable trade relations, and pursuing unreasonable patent laws. Given that Hegel developed a theory of ethical life in opposition to Kant's emphasis on duty, his philosophy may seem an unlikely resource in this debate. But I argue that Hegel would agree that we have a responsibility to the global poor. Hegel clearly thought that civil society had obligations towards those made poor by its excesses. Based on similarities between civil society and the contemporary global economy, I argue that Hegel would have extended this obligation to the global poor. I then ask whether Hegel would have phrased this idea in terms of duty, and, if not, what other resources in his philosophy could found such an obligation. I discuss recognition as a possible source of obligation; drawing on Hegel's analysis of the institutions of ethical life, I also consider whether such obligations are best understood as personal or institutional.