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Underdetermination and theory preference
pp. 145-165
Résumé
Let us begin by reviewing the main results of the previous chapter. It was argued that, provided certain conditions are met, we can construct a purely probabilistic inference to some scientific realist claims. To recap, it was argued that we are justified in adopting realism with respect to some theory T if:
Détails de la publication
Publié dans:
Wright John (2018) An epistemic foundation for scientific realism: defending realism without inference to the best explanation. Dordrecht, Springer.
Pages: 145-165
DOI: 10.1007/978-3-030-02218-1_6
Citation complète:
Wright John, 2018, Underdetermination and theory preference. In J. Wright An epistemic foundation for scientific realism (145-165). Dordrecht, Springer.