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Realism and inference to the best explanation
pp. 79-115
Résumé
The overall aim of this book is to develop an account of the nature of the reasons for scientific realism. So far, our aims have been negative or defensive: they have been to show that the (sceptical) arguments against the rationality of realism are (mostly) flawed. In this chapter we begin task of exploring the arguments that have been advanced for realism.
Détails de la publication
Publié dans:
Wright John (2018) An epistemic foundation for scientific realism: defending realism without inference to the best explanation. Dordrecht, Springer.
Pages: 79-115
DOI: 10.1007/978-3-030-02218-1_4
Citation complète:
Wright John, 2018, Realism and inference to the best explanation. In J. Wright An epistemic foundation for scientific realism (79-115). Dordrecht, Springer.