So, if introspection is not a kind of perception, what is it? What are we doing when we introspect? The primary goal of the remainder of this book is to develop a satisfying answer to this question, providing a viable understanding of introspection and its epistemic properties. Before turning to the details, however, I want to emphasize here in this transitional chapter the fact that introspection is a diverse phenomenon, held together not by a single kind of cognitive process or epistemic status, but rather by a metaphorical unity applied to the subjective first-person orientation we have towards our own minds. Key to understanding the diversity of introspection is the realization that the concept of introspection itself, as a looking within, is a metaphor. If we want an accurate characterization of introspection, we cannot take the concept itself literally. It is, rather, a unifying perceptual metaphor projected onto a diverse set of epistemic relationships we hold to ourselves. Once this is understood, the concept of introspection is opened up for revision, to be reconsidered and reconceived. Regarded as a metaphor, introspection need not be confined to a singular mechanism or process. Instead, it can be treated as a unifying concept for multiple states and processes at work in our first-person epistemic grasp of our own minds. The articulation of this point here will provide a framework for understanding how the various aspects of introspection discussed in subsequent chapters fall together under this one umbrella concept of "introspection".