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Szasz on mental illness
pp. 251-257
Résumé
Dr. Szasz tells us that he will argue that the concept of mental illness causes continuing difficulties because it is a prescriptive concept being used as though it were a descriptive concept, a justificatory concept disguised as an explanatory concept. If his arguments were correct, then he would certainly have spotted a fundamental difficulty with the current use of that concept. I do not know whether or not Dr. Szasz's claim is ultimately correct; all that I shall try to show in my remarks is that Dr. Szasz's arguments for this claim fail.
Détails de la publication
Publié dans:
Engelhardt Tristram, Spicker Stuart (1978) Mental health: philosophical perspectives: proceedings of the fourth trans-disciplinary symposium on philosophy and medicine. Dordrecht, Springer.
Pages: 251-257
DOI: 10.1007/978-94-015-6909-5_18
Citation complète:
Brody Baruch, 1978, Szasz on mental illness. In T. Engelhardt & Spicker (eds.) Mental health: philosophical perspectives (251-257). Dordrecht, Springer.