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Truth, fallibility and the growth of knowledge
pp. 153-174
Résumé
According to a familiar story, beliefs qualify as knowledge only if they can be justified on the basis of impeccable first premisses via equally immaculate first principles. The story has no truth to it. Centuries of criticism suggest that our interesting beliefs are born on the wrong side of the blanket.
Détails de la publication
Publié dans:
Cohen Robert S, Wartofsky Mark W (1983) Language, logic and method. Dordrecht, Springer.
Pages: 153-174
DOI: 10.1007/978-94-009-7702-0_5
Citation complète:
Levi Isaac, 1983, Truth, fallibility and the growth of knowledge. In R.S. Cohen & M.W. Wartofsky (eds.) Language, logic and method (153-174). Dordrecht, Springer.