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A semantic definition of proposition in terms of truth and falsity
pp. 45-59
Résumé
In De Interpretatione Aristotle states a necessary condition for the application of the word "proposition". He writes: "We call propositions those only that have truth or falsity in them. A prayer is, for instance, a sentence but neither has truth nor has falsity".1
Détails de la publication
Publié dans:
Gochet Paul (1980) Outline of a nominalist theory of propositions: an essay in the theory of meaning and in the philosophy of logic. Dordrecht, Springer.
Pages: 45-59
DOI: 10.1007/978-94-009-8949-8_4
Citation complète:
Gochet Paul, 1980, A semantic definition of proposition in terms of truth and falsity. In P. Gochet Outline of a nominalist theory of propositions (45-59). Dordrecht, Springer.