"The Place of Theory in a World of Facts' is vintage Eysenck: erudite, acute, wide-ranging, and provocative. There is much in it that I endorse with enthusiasm. The distinction between strong and weak theories appears to me to be a valuable one, and Eysenck's emphasis on the utility and importance of weak theories is timely and right on target. During the last decade the Popperian picture of science has become widely known and quite influential in scientific circles. Unfortunately, the popularized version is a relatively crude Popperianism which wields the criterion of falsifiability like a cudgel not a scalpel. Eysenck rightly notes that the premature application of Popperian strictures to weak theories may choke off innovative theories before they have had the chance to demonstrate their value. Also to be applauded is Eysenck's brief for the integration of experimental and correlational metatheories. He has mounted a compelling case for the claim that theorists in either metatheoretical tradition neglect theories in the other only at the risk of missing important generalizations and trivializing their own findings.