Pain has been a central concept in moral theories, especially among those that take the conceptual pair of pain–pleasure as central to its very formulation. Thus in a way, they present to us a way of understanding the role of pain in its holistic avatar within the fabric of one's being as being-in-the-world. This essay first undertakes the tracing of this ontology of pain within such moral frameworks through a brief exegetical exercise that is intent on highlighting that the ontology of pain that emerges through these various moral theories is uniformly informed by the principle of contrariety and the principle of naturalness. The second part of the essay would, through broad strokes, bring to fore the implications of these principles upon the ontology of pain. Through this, it would highlight why the ontology of pain as conceived within these moral theories cannot naturally translate into a fully fleshed out discourse on the social ontology of pain and remain, at best, an asocial ontology of pain.