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Kant's theory of criminal punishment
pp. 434-441
Résumé
Kant maintains that guilt is a necessary condition for the legitimate infliction of punishment. Punishment of the innocent is a conceptual and moral pathology. It is largely to avoid such punishment that Kant inveighs against private revenge, vigilante activities, war, and any other activity which allows a disputant to judge his own case and punish according to his own biased decision. Criminal punishment is coercive social power in its most brutal domestic form, and thus it is absolutely essential (in order to preserve freedom) that it be administered only under those procedures of due process found in a just Rule of Law. Such procedures, by securing fairness to the individual, interfere with the utilitarian goals of crime control and criminal rehabilitation. But this, Kant argues, is the price we must pay for liberty and justice.
Détails de la publication
Publié dans:
White Beck Lewis (1972) Proceedings of the Third international Kant congress: held at the university of rochester, march 30–april 4, 1970. Dordrecht, Springer.
Pages: 434-441
DOI: 10.1007/978-94-010-3099-1_42
Citation complète:
Murphy Jeffrie G., 1972, Kant's theory of criminal punishment. In L. White Beck (ed.) Proceedings of the Third international Kant congress (434-441). Dordrecht, Springer.