Linguistique de l’écrit

Revue internationale en libre accès

Livre | Chapitre

189247

Tennessen and the problem of conceptual schemes

James M Brown James Christian BrownRobert Brown

pp. 17-21

Résumé

After surveying some of the interesting aspects of perception, Tennessen argues that we 'seem to need something like a world view, a global conceptual scheme, a conceptual frame of reference." There is, Tennessen quite rightly claims, no such thing as a neutral given. The belief that there could be something prior to any theory, a pristine "testimony of the senses," is nothing more than a myth; we can see only from some "point of view" or other.

Détails de la publication

Publié dans:

Mos Leendert (1986) Annals of theoretical psychology. Dordrecht, Springer.

Pages: 17-21

DOI: 10.1007/978-1-4615-6453-9_2

Citation complète:

Brown James M, Brown James Christian, Brown Robert, 1986, Tennessen and the problem of conceptual schemes. In L. Mos (ed.) Annals of theoretical psychology (17-21). Dordrecht, Springer.