Livre | Chapitre
Tennessen and the problem of conceptual schemes
pp. 17-21
Résumé
After surveying some of the interesting aspects of perception, Tennessen argues that we 'seem to need something like a world view, a global conceptual scheme, a conceptual frame of reference." There is, Tennessen quite rightly claims, no such thing as a neutral given. The belief that there could be something prior to any theory, a pristine "testimony of the senses," is nothing more than a myth; we can see only from some "point of view" or other.
Détails de la publication
Publié dans:
Mos Leendert (1986) Annals of theoretical psychology. Dordrecht, Springer.
Pages: 17-21
DOI: 10.1007/978-1-4615-6453-9_2
Citation complète:
Brown James M, Brown James Christian, Brown Robert, 1986, Tennessen and the problem of conceptual schemes. In L. Mos (ed.) Annals of theoretical psychology (17-21). Dordrecht, Springer.