Livre | Chapitre
Self-determination and immediate self-consciousness in the Jena Wissenschaftslehre
pp. 176-189
Résumé
For all cases in which a subject S represents an object X, where X is an object of a perception, a thought, or a practical aim, S’s representation of X and the manner in which (propositional attitude) S represents X is S’s free yet law-governed self-determination to represent X in the way S represents X.
Détails de la publication
Publié dans:
Rockmore Tom, Breazeale Daniel (2014) Fichte and transcendental philosophy. Dordrecht, Springer.
Pages: 176-189
Citation complète:
Kinlaw Jeffery, 2014, Self-determination and immediate self-consciousness in the Jena Wissenschaftslehre. In T. Rockmore & D. Breazeale (eds.) Fichte and transcendental philosophy (176-189). Dordrecht, Springer.