Professor Polikarov has spent considerable time surveying various dimensions of the science-technology process, and scientific method in particular (Polikarov 1973; 1983). Therein he has expressed a view which has radical implications vis-a-vis traditional philosophy, namely that philosophy of science should itself be considered an extension of the science-technology process, and in this precise sense: Philosophy of science is a more general theory of human cognitive processes than is any particular science and methodologically it stands to the sciences as its domain of phenomena in just the way that a particular scientific theory stands to its domain of phenomena. This view issues in the general naturalist program to understand the world as a natural unity and hence to see knowledge as a natural phenomenon within it. This is a radical enough program philosophically, but the naturalist program further requires seeing the science-technology process and our epistemological understanding of it as a single dynamic system, mutually interactive and with a distinctive historical development.