Livre | Chapitre
Philosophical intuitions, scientific naturalism, and the mathematico-centric predicament
pp. 246-254
Résumé
[H]ow does mathematical language function? Does it relate the world in the same ways as the language of natural science? What happens when human beings come to understand mathematical theories? How does mathematics work in various kinds of applications? And so on. To answer these questions, [the scientific- naturalist philosopher of mathematics] must face many of the metaphysician's concerns: do mathematical entities exist, and if so, what is the nature of that existence? Are mathematical claims true, and if so, how do humans come to know this? These are not detached, extra-scientific pseudo-questions, but straightforward components of our scientific study of human mathematical activity, itself part of our scientific investigation of the world around us.
Détails de la publication
Publié dans:
Chapman Andrew, Ellis Addison, Hanna Robert, Pickford Henry (2013) In defense of intuitions: a new rationalist manifesto. Dordrecht, Springer.
Pages: 246-254
Citation complète:
Chapman Andrew, Ellis Addison, Hanna Robert, Hildebrand Tyler, Pickford Henry, 2013, Philosophical intuitions, scientific naturalism, and the mathematico-centric predicament. In A. Chapman, A. Ellis, R. Hanna & Pickford In defense of intuitions (246-254). Dordrecht, Springer.