This paper considers the origins of the phenomenological experience of emotion. It is argued that contemporary psychology unnecessarily restricts emotional feelings to the sensation of bodily changes, despite there being cognitive origins as well. There may be several reasons for this restricted view. It has a long history, from Descartes to William James to the present; it justifies the collection of physiological data; it seems congruent with there being physical causes and effects of moods and emotions; and it seems congruent with a view of cognition as rational and nonbiological. Yet, these reasons are unsound. Thinking also can be affected by physical causes, and it can be primitive and innate as well. There are compelling reasons to temper the historical emphasis on bodily feelings and physiological measures. Consider that there exist feelings states that seem to be primarily cognitive; examples would be certainty, confusion, amazement, and deja vu. The existence of such states suggests that cognition could contribute to the phenomenological experience - the feeling - of emotion as well. Such a conception has several advantages to recommend it. It helps account for differences in the experience of cognitively complex emotions that have no known physiological differences, and it aids the conceptual reintegration of cognition and affect.