Livre | Chapitre
Hermann Weyl and "first philosophy"
constituting gauge invariance
pp. 279-298
Résumé
The current vogue of naturalism – whether of a pragmatist, instrumentalist or realist variety – in philosophy of physics is largely attributable to a fiction promulgated by logical empiricism, but surviving the latter's demise. It states that relatively theory (especially general relativity) comprised a decisive refutation of Kant, and transcendental idealism more broadly. A closer look at the early years of general relativity reveals a considerably different picture. Here we trace how transcendental idealism informed Weyl's construction of a "purely infinitesimal geometry" whose additional (gauge) degrees of freedom enabled incorporation of electromagnetism into the spacetime metric.
Détails de la publication
Publié dans:
Bitbol Michel, Kerszberg Pierre, Petitot Jean (2009) Constituting objectivity: transcendental perspectives on modern physics. Dordrecht, Springer.
Pages: 279-298
DOI: 10.1007/978-1-4020-9510-8_17
Citation complète:
Ryckman Thomas, 2009, Hermann Weyl and "first philosophy": constituting gauge invariance. In M. Bitbol, P. Kerszberg & J. Petitot (eds.) Constituting objectivity (279-298). Dordrecht, Springer.