The word "alienation" carries with it a swarm of vague but pre-dominantly negative connotations concerning the generally deplorable condition of modern man, theme ad nauseam of numerous psychologists, sociologists, theologians, novelists, journalists, and others.¹ If these connotations accompany us when we approach Sartre's study of alienation in Being and Nothingness, we seem called upon to make a decision: either alienation is not so horrible a phenomenon as others have made it out to be, or Sartre is being naïvely optimistic in missing its horror. If we decide in favor of Sartre's position on the grounds of serious ontological evidence and consider ourselves liberated from the myth of modern man's misery and then turn to Sartre's study of Genet, all the horror returns a thousandfold and we feel betrayed: either Sartre has gone over to their side after all, or he was one of them all the time but deceived us earlier.