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Consequentialism and bayesian rationality in normal form games
pp. 187-196
Résumé
In single-person decision theory, Bayesian rationality requires the agent first to attach subjective probabilities to each uncertain event, and then to maximize the expected value of a von Neumann—Morgenstern utility function (or NMUF) that is unique up to a cardinal equivalence class. When the agent receives new information, it also requires subjective probabilities to be revised according to Bayes' rule.
Détails de la publication
Publié dans:
Leinfellner Werner, Köhler Eckehart (1998) Game theory, experience, rationality: foundations of social sciences, economics and ethics. In honor of John C. Harsanyi. Dordrecht, Springer.
Pages: 187-196
DOI: 10.1007/978-94-017-1654-3_16
Citation complète:
Hammond Peter J., 1998, Consequentialism and bayesian rationality in normal form games. In W. Leinfellner & E. Köhler (eds.) Game theory, experience, rationality (187-196). Dordrecht, Springer.