The mind-body relation or, more particularly, the mind-brain relation ¹ has been a perennial puzzle for philosophers—how can things so different be intimately related? Husserl dealt with the mind-brain relation in Section 63 of Ideen II, "Psychophysischer Parallelismus and Wechselwirkung," ² where he gave a critique of psychophysical parallelism. For Husserl, the mind-brain relation is to be understood not as a material or metaphysical relation, but as a relation between the presented sense or significance of two varieties of appearances. Husserl's account in this section will be examined and the following points will be discussed: (1) Husserl's argument that the significance of brain states is basic to the full sense of a mind operating in an objective world; (2) Husserl's view that a strict parallelism between the psyche and brain is an eidetic impossibility; (3) Husserl's treatment of these questions, in so far as he raises but does not adequately resolve the issue, whether states of consciousness precede or follow brain states; (4) Husserl's somewhat Cartesian failure to distinguish the phenomenological priority of consciousness from the metaphysical question of the possibility of an existent mind apart from a body.