Decisions without sharp probabilities
pp. 213-225
Résumé
Adam Elga [Elga 2010] argues that no principle of rationality leads from unsharp probabilities to decisions. He concludes that a perfectly rational agent does not have unsharp probabilities. This paper defends unsharp probabilities. It shows how unsharp probabilities may ground rational decisions.
Détails de la publication
Publié dans:
Heinzmann Gerhard, Bour Pierre Edouard, Hodges Wilfrid, Schroeder-Heister Peter (2015) Logic and philosophy of science in Nancy (II). Philosophia Scientiae 19 (1).
Pages: 213-225
DOI: 10.4000/philosophiascientiae.1062
Citation complète:
Weirich Paul, 2015, Decisions without sharp probabilities. Philosophia Scientiae 19 (1), Logic and philosophy of science in Nancy (II), 213-225. https://doi.org/10.4000/philosophiascientiae.1062.