Counterpartese, Counterpartese*, Counterpartesen · «Counterpartese, Counterpartese*, CounterparteseD» is a c. ritical examination of some aspects of David Lewis' Counterpart Theory. 1 first briefly discuss the main points of Lewis' theory, and examine, and dismiss, two superficially convincing, but in fact unsatisfactory, objections to it. Then 1 take up the question of how the notion of a counterpart and that of possibility de re are related, and of whether or not Lewis' theory provides a correct interpretation of ordinary modal discourse: my conclusion is that it fails to account for what 1 calI the literal de re status of modality de re, quite independently of whether it is evaluated inside, or outside, the context of realism about possible worlds. 1 discuss, next, a rather intriguing trait of the notion of possibility that realism about possible worlds involves: i. e., that «possible» in «possible world» expresses a relative, and not an absolute, property of a world. 1 show, finally, that, depending on the notion of an essential property it employs, Counterpart Theory can easily accommodate such divergent metaphysical doctrines as indeterminism and superessentialism.