"Was Peirce a genuine anti-psychologist in logic?"
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Résumé
The aim of the paper is to try and make one’s ideas clearer about such concepts as “logic,” “psychology,” “mind,” “normativity,” rationality,” as they were conceived by Peirce, in order to elucidate his genuine position as far as the relationship between logic and pychology is concerned, whether he was or was not a straightforward “anti psychologist” in logic, and from such analyses, to make some suggestions about the contemporary relevance of Peirce’s original views on such isues.
Détails de la publication
Publié dans:
(2017) Pragmatism and psychologism. European Journal of Pragmatism and American Philosophy 9 (1).
DOI: 10.4000/ejpap.1003
Citation complète:
Tiercelin Claudine, 2017, "Was Peirce a genuine anti-psychologist in logic?". European Journal of Pragmatism and American Philosophy 9 (1), Pragmatism and psychologism, n/a. https://doi.org/10.4000/ejpap.1003.